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Criticisms of the market-oriented approach to rural development 
associated with the World Bank are well known. As Alain de Janvry 
sees it, the usual result of this kind of approach is to encourage 
rural differentiation: the community's elite is split off as a
fraction of a class with interests tied to the urban bourgeoisie. 
While the elite’s new status helps the state to suppress 
manifestations of resentment among the bulk of the peasantry, the 
social base is simultaneously subjected to "increased landlessness, 
proletarianization, and immiseration.. ( 1 9 8 1 :  254). Alternatively, 
and speaking specifically of the World Bank, Gavin Williams states 
flatly, "There is very little evidence that recent World Bank 
agricultural projects have benefited the poorest farmers, or even have 
been intended to do so. There is evidence that World Bank loans have 
accrued to the rich rather than the poor, and that some projects have 
excluded the poor from access to productive reserves and redistributed 
assets and incomes to the rich-.." (1981: 25).
One of the main elements of this approach is agricultural credit. 
Corrmentators critical of the World Bank and its international allies 
have argued that agricultural credit here is a major mechanism for 
increasing not only rural differentiation but also the dependence of 
the rural community on the core economy. Against this populist 
viewpoint, some of World Bank experts are urging a sort of 
your' re-another counter-argunent: that efforts to inprove the
position of the poor specifically are counter-productive, and only 
arrive at the same point, of assisting the elites at~the "expense of 
the poor (World Bank, 1975; Adams and Vogel, 1986).
In international efforts to develop Third World agriculture generally, 
cheap subsidized credit has been a major feature of programs designed 
to mobilize rural agriculture. As Forrest remarks, "StAte credit is
2supported by the belief that urban institutions can supply and 
administer flows of cheap credit to the rural sector while/ it is 
held/ shortage of capital is a major constraint on production/ savings 
and incomes are low, and interest rates high." (1981: 238). Provision 
of controlled/ cheap credit is often seen as necessary to:
e avoid exploitation of small farmers by money-lenders and 
middlemen:
e encourage innovation and adoption of new technologies: 
e support technical assistance programs; 
e serve as an urban-to-rural income transfer mechanism: 
e reduce unequal income distribution in rural areas:
• encourage farmers to expand production in spite of adverse terms of 
trade relative to the urban sector (Ruttan 1986: 52-4).
Closer to home/ in South Africa development's programmatic statements 
have also tended to focus heavily on an assumed need for credit 
provision as an absolute requirement for agricultural mobilization in 
the black rural areas. Instead of stressing cheap loans/ they 
emphasize an assumed need for mortgage/ in order to allow 'rational 
capitalization'. Two questions then need considering: first whether 
providing loans/ either as subsidized credit or as mortgage finance, 
is necessary for the upgrading of rural agriculture: and second, if 
credit actually is needed/ what delivery system is appropriate. The 
argument being made here is that there are structural problems between 
the developed formal economy and the rural informal economy which make 
it nearly impossible to provide credit directly, regardless of whether 
it is government lending with a populist rationale or market-oriented 
private finance.
The receivedargTinent specifically 'in~bosiness circles and frequently
. —  .
among agricultural developers as well, (see Buthelezi Commission/ v.2 
and also the Swart Report) holds out that agricultural development has 
been unable to get off the ground in the 'homelands' because potential
3fanners do not have the mdney they need to mobilize modem-oriented 
fanning. Unavailability of credit in the rural community is then 
assumed to be the bottleneck/ preventing potential farmers from buying 
seed, fertilizer/ equipment/ and so forth. It logically follows that 
the potential fanner needs/ depending on viewpoint/ either subsidized 
credit or a mortgage against his land/ his only substantial capital 
asset/ to obtain this credit from the central economy.
Either way/ and however widely accepted/ this proposition represents a
hypothetical argument from first principles/ based on the presumptive
requirements of developed First World agriculture. It ignores the
actual on-the-ground processes involved in agricultural mobilization/
and can be falsified at several points on empirical grounds. Credit
is unlikely to represent a major bottleneck for 'homelands'
agriculture at the moment. There is arguably a real need for credit
in rural black areas/ but formal-sector loans may well be more likely 
0to contribute to the success of agriculture indirectly than directly. 
Because of the on-the-ground characteristics of the credit situation/ 
a real need for either mortgage finance or subsidized credit in order 
to gear up crop production is hard to demonstrate.
South Africa's black agriculture is presently in a low state, being
choked out by competition from wage work and from developed industrial
agriculture, but it continues to contribute a valuable fraction of
household income. Depending on the locality, this fraction ranges
from about half down to almost nothing (Moll 1985, Cross 1985) - but
across this range the agricultural input is still vitally important to0
survival. In addition, it backstops the household economy against the 
risk of losing wage income. On top of that, research results suggest 
that cultivation “Is-'desperately important, to the poverty ..sector in 
rural black communities - that” the very poor,~wfo “are usually the 
people without access either "to formal wages or to transfer payments, 
rely heavily on their agriculture (cf Gandar and Bromberger, 1984, 
Cross 1985).
■N
4The general position of agriculture for most families as a backup 
option then means that as a rule it has a low household priority - 
most of the time, and for most families, agriculture stands fairly low 
among the household's various enterprises: depending on 
circumstances, most families seem to put intensive effort into 
cultivation only when something goes wrong elsewhere in their economic 
support structure. If this is true, then agriculture remains (a) 
indispensable; and (b) capable in principle of being intensified. 
What needs to be looked at is what prevents such an intensification 
from taking place, and specifically whether or not lack of credit 
facilities is a major factor. This paper looks first at some of the 
international literature on credit provision, then summarizes some 
findings relating to ground-level economy of credit in KwaZulu, 
drawing attention to some of the apparent contradictions. It is 
suggested that effective credit provision is likely to be harder them 
is usually anticipated; that the need for agricultural credit is 
probably very limited in most black rural districts; and finally that 
credit resources can probably be better used in other rural sectors.
THE FORMAL CREDIT SITUATION
It has been known internationally for more than twenty years that 
provision of agricultural credit is not necessary in the early stages 
of agricultural development. For instance, Anthony Bottrall, one of 
the most prominent writers on credit in development, asserted in 1976 
of rural credit provision schemes, "Their achievements have been 
mixed, but it is worth noting that...nearly all were established'on 
the assumption that the overriding need of small farmers in the early 
stages of development was for cheap institutional credit. However, 
the evidence suggests that this is rarely the case.;.(1976; 356), 
"...credit is usually unnecessary at the adoption staged..production 
credit is very much an ancillary factor in tiie-eariy^stages--of 
agricultural development, as writers such as Schultz (1965), Mellor
(1966)/ and Mosher (1966) have frequently pointed out" (ibid: 360). 
Instead of going into debt/ cultivators usually pay cultivation 
expenses out of savings/ and draw on the normal throuqh-flov of 
household income and expenditure. This point is underlined by Heyer 
(1981)/ who points out that where wage work is available to provide 
cash income credit programs are likely to be superfluous.
In addition/ even in developed agriculture/ it is not usual for South 
African farmers to use mortgage as a means of financing loans for 
seed, fertilizer and other cropping requirements - instead, loans are 
normally taken against the security of the crop itself, and land is 
not tied into the arrangement. Should other capital loans be called 
for, many types of credit program can be devised which are based on 
other security or on ability to repay, which are more appropriate and 
better adapted. Such programs operate now in Zimbabwe (Bratton 
1986a,b) and in other African countries. The demand for credit 
usually arises only after agricultural mobilization is under way, and 
particularly when a new technology is being adopted and expanded. 
Credit provision efforts then have to relate quite closely to the 
stage of development reached in both the agricultural and credit 
economies. Giving credit does not mobilize agriculture.
Known limits of rural loans
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In South Africa at the moment, indications are strong that quite a lot 
of money is poised to go into loans to black end-users. For instance, 
building societies are on record as having substantial amounts of cash 
ready to be lent to blacks wanting home loans. Much the same cart be 
said of state and parastatal agencies such as the KwaZulu Finance and 
Development Corporation, which lends into 7 black housing, “black 
business, and black agriculture. Nevertheless, it 3eems as if 
relatively little of this money is actually moving to its putative 
destination in capitalizing black- economic objectives-.-  In addition to 
red tape and the acknowledged bureaucratic complications, which -tie
6down even loana to urban blacks, an entire standard range of problems 
afflicts formal-sector attempts to make loans into rural areas of the 
Third World.
Prom the standpoint of the organized financial markets, the obstacles 
include unacceptably hiqh transaction costs, the technicalities 
involved in formal loan requirements and the difficulty of 
establishing credit ratings, and the fungibility of credit. In other 
words, the costs involved in putting through and managing very small 
loans are too high to allow banks and credit-granting agencies, public 
or private, even to break even in most cases. In addition, obtaining 
adequate credit checks and references on rural borrowers who are not 
known to the institution and who do not participate extensively in the 
usual workings of the formal economy further escalates the cost 
factor. Likewise, rural credit is always fungible - meaning that it 
can easily be split up or diverted to other purposes than those for 
which the loan was organized, subverting the entire process of credit 
checks. Osuntogun (1980, quoted below) found that less than 40 
percent of the agricultural funds borrowed by his sample of Nigerian 
farmers actually went into cultivation, and perhaps the main burden of 
rural borrowing actually goes into household consumption needs. In 
this general kind of situation, defaulting on repayment - bad debts - 
then becomes very difficult to police or provide aqainst. Taken 
together, these standard obstacles are so obstructive that lending 
institutions in the organized credit markets are usually unable to 
lend into rural areas on their usual terms, and sometimes on any 
economic terms.
*
These operational problems define the trouble with delivery systems. 
Adams and Vogel (1986) list the maiji available forms of credit agency 
- the possible delivery systems Tor credi£ In- rural areas' as~( l} 
cooperatives (2) government agricultural banks (3) rural private banks 
(4) the credit activities of development agencies. To these, can 
perhaps be added the informal or partly informal routes through
7personal loans/ through informal credit groups/ and through traders 
and storekeepers. In relation to the formal lending agencies/ this 
second group makes up the alternative delivery systems. Most Third 
World governments have followed the advice of experts and put 
agricultural credit into the hands of development agencies or 
government operations set up for the purpose (SFCIs or specialized 
farm credit institutions, cf dell'Amore/ 1972). Alternatively/ in 
some countries/ the financial markets may be obliged by law to make a 
certain percentage of loans to rural borrowers/ to farmers/ or to some 
other development-related target group. Neither method of tackling 
the rural-credit problem has proved to be easy or even effective in 
the majority of cases/ and many are now turning to non-governmental 
organizations. Likewise/ cooperatives have been tried very widely as 
a vehicle for small-scale rural agrarian lending/ but coops have also 
been much less successful throughout many regions of the Third World 
than they usually are in relation to developed agriculture. These 
problems with delivery systems in turn trace back to the underlying 
dynamic of loan programs directed into economically risky areas.
The World Bank critique
The counter-argument mounted by some of the World Bank experts 
focusses on efforts to get cheap credit directly into the hands of the 
poor: the implications run counter to many of the ideas which are 
presently structuring the environment of rural credit in South Africa. 
The World Bank group tries to demonstrate that cheap credit programs 
designed to benefit the small farmer or the small borrower are 
counterproductive/ and harmful to development. Any kind of official 
credit program/ and subsidized ones are no _different/ 
requires borrowers to have good credit ratings. Programs aimed at the 
poor then wind up "delivering loans to the rich. Adams and Vogel 
sketch the points of-this approach:
“The new - view of interest rate policies rejects the 
traditional approach of low-interest loans. These 
traditional policies have generally failed to achieve their
primary objectives of promoting agricultural production and 
assisting the rural poor, and have instead often undermined 
the financial viability of the lenders involved... The main 
recommendation of the new view is that interest rates must 
be high enough so that depositors can be adequately 
compensated and so that lenders can cover their costs”
(1986; 484).
Agricultural loan programs in the Third World are frequently 
•targeted* - that is, they are structured to go to the poor, as beinq 
the rural stratum most in need. The smaller these loans are/ the 
higher# relatively speaking# become the transaction costs involved - 
the cost of administration and credit checks per loan# plus the costs 
associated with possible default. Since the target group is twice 
uneconomic for the organized financial markets - rural and poor - this 
kind of agricultural credit program is usually government-sponsored, 
though in some cases the commercial sector nay be required by law to 
make a certain percentage of loans to the target group (Adams and 
Vogel 1986, Rut tan 1986). To be viable, these rural credit programs 
are usually heavily subsidized to sustain very low interest rates. 
Unfortunately, whether private or from government agencies formed 
specifically to make loans to rural small farming, the usual results 
from these subsidized, targeted loans are not what is intended.
In effect, when financial institutions are required to perform lending 
tasks which are inherently either uneconomic or unrealistic, the 
institutions do not necessarily accept the situation. Rather then 
risk their performance records in making risky loans - structured so 
that failure would be understandable but for which they will be held 
accountable all the same - loan officers and loan institutions tend to 
take evasive action. The kind of behaviour which results has the same 
effect as if the institution actually intended to fight back. When 
cheap loans given to small farmers have high transaction costs and a 
high failure rate, the institution in ef fee trends'“to exercise a -- 
fungibility of its own and divert the bulk of the loans involved to 
larger, more economically sound farmers and to the well-off, who are 
the safest risks for the lenders.(Adams and Vogel op cit, Ruttan op
8
9cit). Bourne and Ora ham (1980) also not* that if the performance of 
lending agencies is assessed on how many loans they make/ then the 
pressure is on for them to make as many as possible/ with resulting 
carelessness about loan quality and the risk of default. The 
implication appears to be that the temptation to push credit toward 
lovest-risk borrowers will then be greater still. This pattern 
appears to hold regardless of whether the credit-granting institution 
is publicly-funded/ as in socialist Third Woirld countries/ or 
private/ as under capitalist regimes. Graham and Cuevas (1984) argue 
from Honduran data that private rural banks are more effective than 
public institu&ons in rural lending. Whether or not this is generally 
true/ the problems involved are clearly structural/ common to most or 
all lending agencies with formal structure.
What the literature/ and especially the recent research associated 
with the World Bank seems to suggest, is that all of the delivery 
routes presently available for formal credit seen to have severe 
drawbacks/ such that credit provided along these lines is unlikely 
either to reach the poor or, under locally prevailing conditions/ to 
contribute effectively to agricultural mobilization. A second danger 
is that subsidies can turn the lending sector toward the government as 
the fruitful source of funding/ so that the bulk of rural savings/ now 
uncaptured by the credit markets/ therefore remain unutilized as far 
as the capital markets are concerned (Adams and Vogel/ 1986). 
Dormant/ they serve the household mostly as emergency insurance, doing 
little for development.
The upshot tends to be that rich rural operators who want large loans 
and who have good credit ratings capture nearly all the cheap credit, 
and expand their operations and take over land resources, the middle 
poor go to town, and the very poor are left high and dry^ in the rural 
areas: in deeper destitution, without the . viable economic 
alternatives that the program was designed to underwrite, and often 
even more precariously placed in relation to whatever survival
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strategies they lived by before. The income distribution therefore 
worsens rather than improves as rural differentiation gathers force. 
When this situation is arrived at/ it approximates very closely to the 
radical critique of the bulk of World Bank-directed rural development 
efforts: rural differentiation is accelerated and the elite inprove
their position at the expense of the poor.
Unfortunately for the World Bank group's critique, it does not seem 
likely that the centerpiece of their proposed solution - abandoning 
subsidization and uncapping interest rates, so that loans to the poor 
become economic even though the poor wind up paying a premium - will 
necessarily uncork the bottleneck. Anderson and Khambata (1985) argue 
that interest rates are not the only problem: unless some plan is 
developed to spread the real risks of financing small agriculture, 
success is unlikely. Reasons cited include:
1. Fears of political reactions in Third World countries to interest 
rates that are significantly higher for small than for large 
borrowers make implementation unlikely:
2. Since the risk factor on rural loans is already very high and 
increasing interest rates makes it higher, managers are not 
willing to be seen with such extremely risky loans in their 
portfolios:
3. In such an explosively high-risk financial environment, 
instability is increased in that defaults by some borrowers raise 
the risk of defaults by others:
4. There is no guarantee that the agrarian development programs
linked to the loans will ever actually succeed in raising rural 
incomes to the point where the borrowers would escape from the 
high-risk, high-rates category, and the lending institution has no 
control over this process (1985: 36). " "
Following this laid-back assessment of the market-rates argument, 
Anderson and Khambata tilt toward the populist side with what they
11
call the economist'a case for publicly-backed loan programs: 
enforcing strictly economic loan criteria can mean that projects with 
good potential are rejected as too risky.
It would then appear likely that both subsidized and market-oriented 
approaches to rural small-farmer lending essentially share the same 
structural problems, which proceed from devout risk-avoidance behaviour 
in and by the financial institutions even "beyond the point of 
economic efficiency" (Anderson and Khambata, op cit).
More luckily/ the other main elements of the World Bank group's 
proposed solution look more likely to help. These are (1) routing 
much of the demand for credit through local informal credit markets 
rather than through formal institutions/ and (2) mobilizing savings. 
These themes will reappear later on.
Alternative approaches: traders/ cooperatives/ group loans/ and 
mortgage
Other possible alternative approaches to delivering small agricultural 
loans from the larger economy to the village are subsumed under Adams 
and Vogel's (op cit, 6 above)
list of possible delivery systems: these include formal cooperatives/ 
and possible informal vectors such as storekeepers or spontaneous 
self-help groups such as savings clubs or farmer associations. Aside 
perhaps from storekeepers, these routes all appear to have the 
adantage of being able to carry group liabilities. Then in addition/ 
there is mortgage finance.
♦
Storekeepers. The objections which might apply to channelling loans 
through traders and storekeepers (discussed in Barbara Harriss, 1980) 
are straightforward..Though'' Bratton^s ' data “^indicates —  that 
storekeepers are not a common source of'agricultural credit "in 
Zimbabwe, and the Nongoma pilot study suggests the same/ rural traders 
in the South African 'homelands' normally do keep accounts for local
x
customers and sometimes extend loans of agricultural supplies against 
the customer's account/ so this route might be a procedurally viable 
one. In some countries/ trader-moneylenders have been encouraged to 
start rural banks. On the other hand, it seems doubtful if this is a 
practice which ought to be deliberately expanded and institutionalized 
in a climate where it is not already widespread, the risk of creating 
permanent relations of debt and dependency, of the kind that already 
exist in India and the Far East and frighten policy-makers world-wide, 
could easily outweigh the benefits.
Formal cooperatives have been widely regarded throughout the Third 
World as a vehicle for bringing the central economy into touch with 
the rural grass roots. By working with groups rather than with 
individuals, the transaction costs of loans, and particularly the 
credit checks,can in principle at least be made more feasible, while 
the group also serves as a conduit for supplies and extension 
services. For instance, Kenya's Cooperative Savings Scheme has 
operated fairly successfully in many rural districts, providing 
savings, loans, and marketing services (von Pischke 1976). 
Unfortunately, Third World agricultural cooperatives are usually 
subject to chicken-and-egg syndrome: they are very difficult to
organize unless some kind of successful semi-commercial agriculture - 
such as coffee production - already exists to create a felt need, 
justify a marketing system to which they can be linked, and help 
instigate spontaneous groups. In Kenya, the credit and savings scheme 
is reported to have been added as a later component to an agricultural 
cooperative movement already operating around coffee as a viable 
market crop. Bottrall's (op cit) and Hyden's (1976), discussion 
suggests that this is the usual pattern, and that trying to establish 
cooperatives in advance, in order to then establish an agriculture 
which will justify them, is usually unsuccessful. ; - _ ___ _ .
Fully-fledged formal cooperatives also require a high level of 
management expertise difficult to- find in impoverished rural
13
districts/ especially since the interest returns to participants are 
relatively low. There is a large literature on the difficulties faced 
by cooperatives in Africa and the Third World generally/ which need 
not be reviewed here. Particularly/ coops tend to be viewed by 
governments as ideal vehicles for bringing bureaucratic control to the 
isolated village/ so that their function in stimulating agriculture 
gets lost or becomes downgraded (King 1981). The same applies when 
they are captured by local elites (Hyden op cit/ Claassens 1978). 
Either way/ coops as they came to operate seem more likely to paralyze 
local initiative and cannibalize spontaneous self-help groups than to 
promote production or channel credit.
Group liabilities
More success trey perhaps be encountered with less structured farmer 
groups. In KwaZulu/ RFC is working with group liabilities in extending 
credit in smallholder schemes. In several ways the KFC scheme seems to 
be based on an accurate appreciation of the in-built problems of 
lending. KFC's new rural lending policy for Project Ummbila has 
waived security requirements altogether/ and makes loans on the 
understanding that the farmer pays at least 20 percent of his own 
costs and will not be eligible for future loans if he does not pay KFC 
back. The actual loans are written by agricultural officers in the 
field/ a system found effective in Nigeria (Oludimu and Fabiyi 1984) 
and elsewhere. The scheme also has some drawbacks. Tied to 
'betterment'-type land planning/ the scheme makes special loans to 
"certain individuals" (qualifications unspecified) to buy tractors and 
"do all the tillage work in a given area" and then sets the fees and 
rounds up groups of clients for these tractor owners. It also appears 
to have a long way to go to reach a market-determined break-even 
point.
The figures provided by Konigkramer and van den Aardweg (1986) 
indicate that each agricultural officer would have to write 473 loans/
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of a hefty average aize of Rl 100 each, to break even; the best result 
reported to date on the Made deni group scheme reached 350 loans/ 
leaving a long way to go. Mark Lyater of Development Bank reports 
that KPC credit coats can run to an average of 70 cents for each rand 
lent (1987/ in press). On the World Bank group’s analysis of 
subsidized credit/ agricultural officers writing loans in the field 
should then be feeling substantial pressure to push loans toward their 
most solvent clients and away from the poor.
KFC’s procedure can then be compared against the three Zimbabwean loan 
schemes discussed by Bratton (1986a/b). Considering much smaller 
agricultural loans (roughly R50 - R33o), Bratton compares individual 
loans made by Zimbabwe's Agricultural Finance Corporation to loan 
schemes operating on a group-liability basis. These group loans are 
operated either by AFC on a mandatory joint-security basis/ where 
group members are legally forced to pay off each other's defaults,or 
by an NGO operating on a basis of voluntary joint responsibility. 
That is/ if the group defaults it loses eligibility for future loans/ 
so paid-up members have the option to decide whether to pressure 
delinquent members/ help them out, or eject them from the group and 
cover the unpaid loan share themselves if they collectively want to 
stay eligible (1986b).
On the basis of data such as comparative rates of repayment and number 
of stock owned by participating families as an index of their economic 
standing/ Bratton concludes that the group loans performed much beter 
than individual loans in normal years. He also argues that the 
non-governmental voluntary group scheme was more effective in reaching 
women farmers and the poor than the mandatory-liability scheme. The 
point about reaching women and the poor is problematic - while the 
voluntary-liability group did seem to have significantly more women 
members/ so much help and guidance was apparently supplied to 'these - - 
groups as part of the NGO's loan package that it becomes hard to be - 
sure that the inclusion of women was spontaneous. "Reaching the poor"
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is even mors doubtful on the evidence. Participants seemed to be 
drawn from the elite: though large gape between rich and poor are now 
common in rural districts, the difference in average stock ownership 
between the richest group - the individual loan recipients - and the 
voluntary-liability group, which was supposedly poorest, was only 
about 11 percent.
Only in the case of the mandatory-liability group, and only in a good 
crop season, was the recovery rate satisfactory at 92 percent. For 
all other combinations of loans and weather, defaults ranged from 28 
to 82 percent. Though Bratton identifies the voluntary liability group 
as a hopeful signpost for the future, he acknowledges that this 
approach lost money at about 37 percent yearly, made up from 
subsidies. While the mandatory-liability approach nearly broke even, 
farmer groups under this regime tended to fall apart due to internal 
strain.
Some version of this approach may ultimately turn out to be one of the 
most successful alternatives where rural credit is concerned. 
However, Adams and Vogel are dubious about the chances of getting 
group loan schemes to fulfil expectations: "Recent research on group 
lending shows results that are less positive than originally hoped. 
While group lending generally reduces loan transactions costs for 
borrowers, it has had a less positive impact on lender's transactions 
costs and on loan recovery." Underlining von Pischke's point, they 
add, "Group loans appear to work best where groups have non-credit 
reasons for collective actions" (1986 : 482). This kind of result 
returns the debate to the same stumbling block as for cooperatives, 
that agricultural groups have to be already well-established before 
they can be used as a conduit for formal-sector credit - which in turn 
presupposes a well-established agriculture prior to credit.
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Mortgage finance
Finally/ the mortgage option itself is likely to be very risky/ 
whether or not it is either necessary or viable. Hill's comparative 
results from rural Nigeria and India suggest that in both cases 
foreclosures on land mortgaged locally by the poor to the rich 
accounted for a substantial percentage of all land transfers. They 
also appeared to contribute to landlessness and impoverishment. 
Rather than moving triumphantly to town/ the destitute former 
landholders tended to join the local force of landless or 
near-landless labourers# ending up worse impoverished than before 
their venture into land-secured credit (Hill# 1982). In this context/ 
the formal urban credit institutions were not interested in extending 
mortgage loans even to the relatively viable rural borrowers - the 
difficulties of following up the loan# or of foreclosing if necessary# 
were so great that Hill's discussion suggests that the urban bankers 
would have to be heavily bribed to try it.
Mortgage then seems likely to follow the same path as subsidized 
credit in increasing the differentiation of rural communities along 
class lines - helping the rich get richer# while the poor are left 
without the viable alternatives that were the ostensible point of the 
exercise. In the South African context# if the intense fixation on 
agricultural mortgage is carried through into legislation without a 
great deal of caution the rural poor are in fact likely to become 
worse off# not only in relative terms but in absolute terms as well.
THE RURAL CREDIT ECONOMY
At the other end-of “the line# the situation on the ground is also not 
what is is usually assumed to be. The conventional argument about 
mortgaging and rural agricultural credit ignores the fact that loans 
of the size needed - roughly R 25-R 300 - may already be available in 
many rural districts. Results of preliminary field studies in
17
KwaZulu# both in the peri-urban region (Cross 1986a# 1987a, N-00) and 
in the Nongoma area (B. Zulu and C. Cross# unpublished field data# 
N»34) demonstrate that a thick and thriving network of credit and 
lending already exists in the informal sector. Depending on 
individual circumstances# these informal loans can be obtained either 
free of charge or else for interest payments. In early 1986 the 
average informal peri-urban debt burden for men was over R 100. With 
virtually everyone in the community who was not utterly destitute both 
borrowing and lending regularly in this informal loan exchange# most 
men and a great many women had experience of informal loans in the R 
100 - R 500 bracket. In Nongoma# the credit market looked somewhat 
less active# but still strong.
This highly active rural credit market provides various kinds of 
finance. The main burden of lending is carried by interpersonal debt 
- ad hoc loans between individuals known to each other or somehow 
related - but credit is also obtainable from the informal savings 
associations loosely grouped as 'stockfels'# which make loans from 
their savings funds. These can be either rotating credit associations 
of the classical type# where members meet to pay in weekly or monthly 
with different people taking the entire payout in rotation# or they 
can be a new type of informal credit collective# which accepts 
irregular payments from members and makes loans from liquid funds 
before banking them for distribution at the end of the year. In 
addition to these sources/loans can also be obtained from individuals 
who have a sideline as local money-lenders# as well as from individual 
employers# and from firms. The normal situation in mobilizing areas 
seems to be that credit is widely available from a number of different* 
sources# while in severely impoverished regions loans become harder to 
get (Bottrall# 1976# King 1981). Although the Nongoma pilot sample 
came from a poorer community than the peri-urban one# the credit 
market did not look severely constricted. - ■— ------
In principle# loans from the formal urban credit market - the banks
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and building societies - are also within reach, but the great majority 
of respondents reported reactions of ranging from unease to outright 
fear at the prospect of dealing with a bank. Banka were regularly 
identified as the worst possible loan source, and there was no 
apparent awareness that bank rates are at least nominally far cheaper 
than interest-bearing informal credit. Though a few people remarked 
that banks were strict but fair and provided excellent privacy, for 
nearly the whole of this sophisticated peri-urban sample the
preference for the local informal credit market was very strong (Cross 
1986a, 1987a). Fragmentary data from the Nongoma pilot study also 
suggested that credit from KFC was not universally popular; this 
source was apparently not used by the peri-urban sample.
The exploitation issue
This general picture is in line with the usual situation in Third 
World rural communities. As Polly Hill observes from her extensive 
field experience, the informal credit market is part of the normal 
environment, all but universal in rural areas once they enter the cash
economy (Hill 1982, 1986). This fact is not usually recognized in
Third World policy planning, which has in the past often treated
informal credit as pathological or inherently exploitive.
To the limited extent that they have been aware of their existence on 
the local scene, South African policy-makers have been reluctant to 
trust the black informal credit markets or build them into official 
planning. Peasantries in rural Asia have historically suffered and 
still suffer from crippling debt obligations sometimes described* as 
'debt slavery', although informal credit in India did and does also 
help the community, especially --in bankrolling trade and industry 
(Tinberg and Aiyar, 1985). Hill argues that the world-vide official.: 
distrust of informal financial markets produced by this Far Eastern 
experience is based on misunderstanding. In addition, she asserts 
that in Africa specifically, the local credit market is generally not
as exploitative as policy-makers fear. Local elites do carry on very 
extensive debt relations with poorer strata in the community/ but this 
is often less due to profit or exploitation than to a social 
obligation to lend to others as a means of providing them with 
economic assistance when they need it (Hill 1986). In the KwaZulu 
peri-urban area studied, mutual observance of debt relations today to 
a great extent takes the place of the now-lapsed pre-industrial 
relations of gift exchange in knitting together individuals and groups 
(Cross 1986).
Interest rates
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A more convincing and immediate reason for taking a critical view of 
the rural informal credit market is interest rates. The new 
market-powered World Bank approach no longer takes high informal 
interest rates as a reason for excommunicating rural financial 
markets: it has been known at least since the early 1970s that 
interest rates as high as 30-40 percent may only cover the actual 
costs associated with rural moneylending (Bottomley 1971, quoted in 
Bottrall 1976: 361). But interest rates now being reported for small 
loans in KwaZulu are running considerably higher: rates equivalent to 
60-80 percent for very short-term credit are being reported both from 
peri-urban and from rural districts. Though charges for larger loans 
seem not to run as high, comparisons with earlier data suggest that 
interest rates have shot up over the last five to ten years. Interest 
charges have also become very general - while relatives can often get 
interest-free loans, it is common now for even close family members to 
be charged interest.
To a considerable extent, these high -rates reflect the fairly high 
real risk of partial or complete default, and also the chance of -an 
indefinite stretching-out of repayment time: - informal personal-loans 
seem to carry a built-in presumption that they can be renegotiated and 
rolled over if the borrower has difficulty in meeting his obligation
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(Oludimu and Fabiyi/ 1984, Cross 1986 ). Even informal institutional 
credit from stockfels is very flexible compared to formal-sector 
loans. The preliminary indications from KwaZulu suggest that loans 
are fairly generally available/ from a number of informal sources. 
All the same, the point remains that interest-bearing informal credit 
may be becoming so expensive that poorer families are priced out of 
the credit market altogether. At the same time, introduced 
institutions such as credit unions are likely to be unable to compete, 
in terms of returns to depositors, with the lucrative informal credit 
associations.
How does the informal credit market work?
With this background in mind, the peri-urban informal credit market
seem to have certain general characteristics (Cross, ibid);
• Nearly the entire community is involved - even the absolutely
destitute try to participate so as to be able to get credit when 
they need it
• Informal credit provides the regular operating capital for both 
snail and large informal selling operations, and also finances 
capital investment very widely
• The largest number of informal loans are taken for minor
emergencies - personal cash shortfalls for illness, transport,
legal problems, family or personal needs, or entertainment
• The informal credit market is the community's new system of
insuring against unforeseen emergencies.
For the peri-urban women, the most common use for informal credit was 
in relation to consumption - in buying food, to make up shortfalls in 
the household budget. But in an area where informal sector 
participation is common to the majority of households, the economic 
use of credit in capitalizing informal commerce ranked second. _ For 
men, a tremendous demand for credit .was immediately apparent in the 
field of construction and house building - ranked joint first, in — 
actual reported frequency, with entertainment and social borrowing -
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and credit also figured importantly in relation to informal commerce. 
Sponsored loans into agriculture?
CXit of all this traffic in the local financial market* not one 
respondent# man or woman# cited loans into cultivation as a 
most-frequent use for credit. In response to specific inquiries# a 
minority of respondents mentioned having taken loans to help with 
cultivation* but none cited a loan above R 50. The general picture 
for agricultural loans# with or without interest# was one of very 
sporadic and rather reluctant involvement* with local families trying 
to hold down their total debt and trying to minimize agricultural 
expenses at the same time. The pattern appeared to be that people 
became involved in agricultural borrowing only in a minor-emergency 
context - when they suddenly found themselves unable to cover their 
cultivation expenses out of the general household budget. The small 
pilot sample from Nongoma suggests that the pattern may not be 
basically different there# although families have more* and do more 
cultivation. Although the credit market is not as active generally 
and agriculture is more important* most respondents were still as 
little involved as possible in agricultural credit. Other competing 
uses for credit were ranked as more important.
This general pattern is in line with findings elsewhere in Africa. 
For instance# Os untog un examined the use of subsidized farm credit by 
a sample of farmers in three Nigerian states:
"...only 39,4 percent of the total funds borrowed was used 
for farming...[and] contrary to widely held opinion* a very , 
small proportion of borrowed funds is spent on ceremonial 
purposes. Hence one of the principal reasons [for the 
diversion of funds] ...is the inadequate supply of essential 
welfare services in the rural areas. Services like modern 
housing* health, and education relief rarely exist in -the 
Nigerian rural sector. Most farmers borrow to provide these 
services themselves..." (1900 : 269) . __ - -
In effect* what seems to happen with most formal credit programs in
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rural areas is that both sides exercise fungibility - the sponsoring 
institutions divert loans to the rich# and the rural recipients divert 
borrowing to the household's other# more urgent priorities. Taking all 
the evidence together# it is hard to believe that either subsidized 
agricultural credit or market-related agricultural mortgage is going 
to result in an upward explosion of agricultural production in 
KwaZulu. Credit is already widely available and widely used# but 
agriculture does not so far seem to be an important credit sector. On 
the other hand# it is very clear that the rural community needs and 
uses credit# and can probably make good use of credit at lower 
interest rates. The key is likely to be supplying credit into the 
rural economy in the round# rather than trying to restrict borrowing 
to agricultural purposes and promptly falling into the bottomless well 
of fungibility.
The community's view of credit risk: insurance through lending out
The credit picture is also influenced by how the community sees credit 
generally. First# credit is still something that is treated with 
great care. Nearly every peri-urban respondent insisted that modem 
life is impossible without credit# but older people still look askance 
at borrowing. In conservative thought# borrowing still indicates 
weakness and inability to plan properly. Economic transactions are 
supposed to be carried out only with money in hand (Cross 1986). The
general moral view was that it is wrong to borrow money casually# 
though casual borrowing is in fact very common. Interest-bearing 
loans especially should only be considered for serious purposes - or 
when the chance of profit looks high enough to justify the ri^k. 
People felt satisfaction at being in the position of helping others, by. 
extending loans when they could afford to, but usually seemed to feel 
resigned over ever being able to avoid debt themselves. -This basic. _ 
ambivalence toward borrowing r - though not toward lending - has 
implications for credit programs. -- ..3.
N
23
Despite popular ambivalence/ involvement in local credit transactions 
is economically necessary in itself: it provides the rural black 
community's new approach to do-it-yourself universal risk insurance in 
an unstable/ wage-based economy still touching the poverty line (Cross 
1986a/ 1987a). Bratton reports that his Zimbabwean respondents used 
stockfel savings when necessary to backstop possible defaults on their 
agricultural loans (1986b). But lending rather than borrowing may be 
the more significant credit activity/ because of its role in savings 
and insurance. Results indicate that for the lender/ informal lending 
serves a vital purpose in putting disposable money into safe-keeping# 
in the form of inter-personal debt obligations. Debts/ as a secure 
intangible asset/ then serve as savings/ and risk of default is 
reduced by spreading smaller loans widely. A still more important 
economic function of these debts is that they can be used as an asset 
to secure a line of informal credit to raise money quickly on the 
point of need. The chief way that stockfel savings support the 
saver's economic position is probably in serving as security for 
establishing a personal line of credit. A stockfel's cyclic payout is 
not liquid mostc£ the time# and rarely arrives at the moment it is 
most needed. The practice of borrowing against stockfel savings as 
surety makes interpersonal lending# rather than credit clubs# the main 
informal savings mechanism of the modem rural black community (Cross 
1985c# 1986a). Formal credit programs cannot match the multiplex 
functions of the informal credit market in this regard. Nor does 
official credit address the uses which are seen as most important or 
most moral at the grass roots.
The community's view of credit: what people want from a loan
In this economic climate, social approval for different credit uses 
seems to be pushed up by the project's economic importance or urgency 
(illness# informal business) - but driven down by risk (buying a car) 
or any kind of morality loading: either by frivolousness-(gambling, 
fancy clothing) # or by such solemn purpose that the undertaking should
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not be trusted to credit (paying ilobolo or school fees). Table 1 
gives a short breakdown of the community's relative approval of 
different possible uses for interest-bearing informal credit.
TABLE Is COMMUNITY APPROVAL FOR POSSIBLE CREDIT USES
Percent of sample approving in principle# men and women# N » 64
” sickness in family loo%
something you are expected to do 91% 
IMPROVE INFORMAL ENTERPRISE 89% 
close relative in jail 88%
BUY STOCK FOR INFORMAL ENTERPRISE 86% 
pay H/P at local store 83%
START AN INFORMAL ENTERPRISE 80%
PAY INFORMAL DEBTS 80% 
money for a friend in trouble 73%
BUILD A HOUSE 69%
PAY STOCKFEL CONTRIBUTION 69%
PAY SCHOOL FEES 69%
pay informal account with neighbour selling 61%
being completely broke 61% 
help with cultivation 49% 
entertain socially 42% 49%
PAY ILOBOLO 27% 
fancy clothing 27%
BUY CAR 6% 
gamble 6%
The data indicate that economic# money-making ventures have a 
consistently high priority# ranking with what are seen as serious 
family emergencies. Informal credit is normally the only source of 
working credit for these informal business ventures. These then stand 
as accepted, 'normal' uses for informal credit. But for other 
economic uses (building a house# investing in transport) approval 
seems to depend on whether or not the risk factor can be broken, up 
into smaller# practical loans. While a house can be built informally 
with low risk by using successive small loans over a long period# the 
deposit on even a second-hand car is a substantial one-off payment 
with a high risk of failure. Divisibility is a major decision factor-, 
in relation to credit in rural financial markets. Anything that can
be done in successive increments can be broken into a series of small 
loans# available from the informal credit market if enough disposable 
income is circulating around. Agricultural borrowing can qualify in 
this respect, but its risk factor is high and uninsurable. The low 
household priority of agriculture under prevailing economic conditions 
seems to mean a low borrowing priority as well: though the data are
not complete# agriculture apparently ranked low for community credit 
approval. If so, there would seem to be a high probability of funging 
if agricultural credit should be the only kind available. Houses are 
very important# and a secure investment; cropping is relatively less 
important# and a classic source of uncontrolled risk. A question then 
arises as to what groups in the community might be able to sustain 
agricultural commitment.
Target groups in the modem community
Other field results for the peri-urban community studied pointed to 
two groups showing enough embryonic commitment to their cultivation to 
make them potential targets for agricultural loans: the well-off or
"rich", and the very poor. Middle-income families# smaller and 
younger on average than the well-off# tended to let their agriculture 
slide down their ladder of priorities. For the large complex 
households of the well-off# not only total income but also 
agricultural commitment varied directly with the number of cash 
incomes entering the family# drawing attention to the importance of 
savings and self-capitalization in financing cultivation. For the 
poor# destitution is the occasion for commitment# and intensified 
commitment of labour seems to substitute for capital and credit. This 
result is in line with Sahlins’ (1972) proposition that any production 
system can in a pinch be intensified by adding additional labour time 
alone# without recourse to any other form of input. - - - --- - -
A retrodiction exercise in correlating ;the. factors associated with 
past agricultural success indicates that families-with a 1981 cash
«** I
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income of R TOO a month or more (translating to something like R 16 0 0 
in 1987} plus a sound household structure/ advanced developmental 
cycle, an older man as head/ and at least one vege earner, were 
associated with successful commitment to agriculture and with 
semi-commercial cultivation (Cross 1985). The single variable that 
best served as a surrogate for all the separate factors involved 
seemed to be the total number of earners per household. In other 
words, the greater the total cash income entering the household 
economy/ and the greater the total number of potential workers and the 
greater the consumption demand, the higher the chances of a strong 
agricultural commitment. For these large households with contrdof 
substantial cash resources/ committing effort to crop production makes 
sense as a contribution to food resources/ with the unneeded yield 
being sold in good years into the local market as a sideline
enterprise.
But even these families with high agricultural involvement seem to 
follow the strategy of holding down total cash expenditure on
cultivation/ and count on funding their agricultural enterprise from
the regular through-flow of the household budget. While these 
families had the resources and the commitment to expand their
agricultural operation/ few of them appeared to be interested in 
increasing their exposure to risk by bringing credit into the picture. 
Preliminary results suggest that these households were more involved 
in lending than in borrowing.
The alternate target group would then be the very poor. As mentioned, 
the destitute rely heavily on their agriculture, putting in extra work 
to make up for lack of money to spend on inputs. The peri-urban 
survey revealed a determined group of elderly. women coming from 
weak-structured households, whose commitment to cultivation was
relatively high, but never likely.-to build -i_into_a_ stable
entrepreneurial operation. The possibility of actually getting credit 
to this group looks very dubious in the light of the usual pattern of
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diverting formal loans to the rich described by the World Bank 
experts. In addition# the chances of credit given for agriculture 
being diverted to more immediate needs would a priori appear to be 
prohibitively high for women already in a desperate situation. If the 
pattern by which these two groups are the main active proponents of 
rural cultivation holds outside of the peri-urban region# then a 
viable target group for either agricultural mortgage loans or 
subsidized agricultural credit may be hard to define.
CONCLUSIONS
The World Bank group and its critics both present data that suggest 
that with the best will in the world# there is probably no plan 
reliably able to channel loans from the central economy to the rural 
poor# and particularly not to the rural destitute. The contradictions 
are structural# in the nature of formal lending and informal 
borrowing# and they appear to be too great. Whatever is done# and 
whoever does it# the typical outcome appears to be to help the elite 
and further marginalize the poor. In addition, the formal credit 
institutions and the rural comnunity probably have diametrically 
opposed views of what they want in regard to credit. The financial 
markets need to build up to bigger loans with clear-cut terms for 
repayment and security# while the rural community wants to stick with 
small loans that are easily managed and easily renegotiated. Both 
sides are probably accurate in their vision of what they need. Small 
loans may have a positive value in themselves from the standpoint of 
the community - in other words# snail loans are more moral because 
they do not put household finances and the family good name in danger 
by risking the borrower getting in over his head. If the loan is Big 
enough to interest a formal credit institution# then it _is probably 
too big for most rural people to try-without getting into the risk 
zone that individuals fear and that draws community disapprovali- —
If this is true, and if it is also true that the community's ideal
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approval and actual use of agricultural credit are both far below the 
priority given to emergencies and to informal income-generating 
enterprise , then further contradictions emerge/ and constraints are 
established.
It may be necessary to rethink trying to structure the rural credit 
context so as to come closer to the desiderata of government lending 
agencies or of the organized financial markets. Instead/ it may work 
better to redefine the programmatic need for credit/ and to look 
closely at the chances for promoting higher agricultural production in 
other ways.
Credit needs in rural communities
What black rural agriculture then needs first is incentive - on 
Zimbabwe's example, specifically pricing policy, and a market.
Railing these, it is not economic for rural families to commit risk 
money to inputs, let alone borrowed capital. Credit comes later, as 
advanced technology spreads and informal farmer organizations take 
form spontaneously. In the meantime, capitalization can be taken care 
of through informal small loans and/or through loans from employers or 
rural-bank loans, whether parasfatal, private, or cooperative. These 
are accessible and cover the amounts needed at present for the vast 
majority. The informal financial market, as Heyer and others have 
argued, can probably cover agricultural finance up to the point when 
agriculture takes on a much higher household priority than it has now.
In view of the weak record of formal agricultural coops, both in terms 
of performance criteria and of hidden agendas of control for 
exploitation, it is more than possible that the reserves are not in a 
position to use them effectively other than in the few areas where *
cash-cropping is established and v i a b l e . ------
For this kind of rural development, other aspects of -the crural ^ economy ... -
are at least as important as agriculture and seem to need credit more 
urgently at present: these are housing construction and informal
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commerce. These activities also appear to have a higher priority for 
the average rural family than does agriculture. As the situation is 
configured now, these are probably the expansion areas most vital in 
priming the rural economy. The credit demand for these areas is 
therefore urgent.
In a cash economy dependent on wage work/ agriculture suffers from 
high risk aversion generally: in peri-urban areas loan money is
available now, but agriculture is not seen as important enough for the 
household to risk becoming involved in substantial amounts of debt. 
Those households with the structural capabilities needed to move into 
semi-commercial agriculture prefer to organize their production 
expenses within the general cash flow of the household's operating 
budget/ as Bottrall's discussion might suggest. In rural Nongoma, the 
level of general interest in agriculture is higher/ and a possible 
need for relatively small cultivation loans could be present. Whether 
or not such loans may be provided through the organized urban 
financial markets is another question.
What is needed is to increase the capacity of the rural community to 
produce its own loan funds, particularly for housing and commerce/ but 
also for consumption and other legitimate needs. In the present 
environment of high risk and uneconomic prices/ the main bottlenecks 
to expansion are still the distribution system and low rural cash 
flow. This can partly be done by working at the urban end to increase 
potential cash flow into rural areas by improving wages. But 
increasing rural cash flow by increasing disposable income is only 
part of the problem.
Behind the overall problem of black agricultural production is the 
semi-proletarian issue, the question of whether South Africa's rural 
black communities, whose people do not qualify-as peasant producers,—  
can be persuaded by policy initiatives ^to Invest more effort in 
agriculture. No less an authority than de Janvry (1981) argues that
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semi-proletarian communities generally are beyond the reach of rural 
development programs. In KwaZulu specifically/ it looks as if 
government-determined producer prices are not high enough to draw much 
interest. Prices paid locally for agricultural produce regularly run 
higher/ but the local market gluts quickly/ and in the present context 
of uninsured risk and strong competition from wage work even the 
relatively good returns available do not seem to generate any 
wide-scale commitment to semi-commercial production. The most usual 
pattern may be the one where a few families in each locality take up 
crop production as a sideline. To change this pattern and reach the 
level of commitment and success achieved by Zimbabwe and Kenya could 
require a very large direct transfer of resources from the 
urban-industrial sector - or, alternatively/ taking steps to expand 
the rural black economy to provide its own market for agrarian 
producers.
The World Bank strategy of mobilizing savings is therefore critical. 
Instead of insisting on mortgage under conditions favourable to formal 
lending/ which can only help the rich and increase the risk to the 
rest of the community/ a preferable approach would be to work to 
improve the local credit ratings of the groups most at risk now. One 
way to do this is to set up rotating rural bank facilities to appear 
in rural communities on pension days/ fully equipped to transact 
savings and lending/ and allowed to pay a small advantage over 
presently accessible savings facilities. With a bank account to 
backstop borrowing/ there is a chance that the access of the rural 
poor to local informal loans could be improved. In addition/ there is 
a need for savings and lending facilities that compete against the 
high interest charges on informal lending. What appears to be the 
most healthy credit pattern for a developing rural area is one where a 
nuntoer of alternative credit outlets/ formal and informal/ are 
available and able to compete against each other. To achieve this 
sort of pattern/ the introduction of viable-credit from the .central 
economy can only help..
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